Migration and Resettlement Patterns of Somalis in the Diaspora: A Case Study of Italy and Australia

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Abstract

Since 1991, large numbers of Somalis have migrated abroad. Many of them relocated to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, others reside further afield in western countries.

With the understanding that processes of settlement are varied, this article gives an overview of the social context in which Somali migration and settlement has occurred in two countries, Italy and Australia. In Italy, citizenship is seldom granted to Somalis. On the other hand, Australia offers official recognition to them in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or “thin” this may be.

This article compares the resettlement trajectories of migrants and refugees from Somalia in the two countries. This comparative overview forms a basis for understanding the immigration policies and perceptions of immigrants in Italy and Australia and makes possible an informed engagement with the nuances of Somali experiences in the diaspora.

Keywords: Somali Diaspora, Immigration patterns, Resettlement Patterns, Italy, Australia,
Introduction

What migration and settlement options have existed for Somalis fleeing difficult conditions in Somalia? How have Somalis resettled in the diaspora? Since the outbreak of the Civil War in Somalia in 1991, large numbers of Somalis have migrated abroad. Many Somalis relocated to refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen.¹ A significant Somali population resides further afield, in the United States. Italy and Australia have become home to significant numbers (approximately 8000 in Italy and 6000 in Australia) – although both sets of figures are problematic and discussed further below – and it is these specific cases that this article examines.

With the understanding that processes of settlement are multilayered,² this article gives an overview of the social context in which Somali migration and settlement has occurred in two diverse countries, Italy and Australia. In Italy, citizenship is seldom granted to Somalis, offering little stability. Australia offers official recognition to Somali refugees in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or “thin” this may be.³ The fact that this citizenship has not produced feelings of home in Somalis suggests the extent to which being at home is a complex and multi-scalar process, comprising civic and domestic domains, cultural and official belonging.⁴ This article compares the resettlement trajectories of migrants and refugees from Somalia in the two countries, with particular attention to issues surrounding belonging and the importance of citizenship.

2.1 The Italian Context

While Australia is still an immigrant nation, in many western countries over the past few decades the balance between emigration and immigration has shifted. This is certainly the case for Italy, a country
which has since the 1980s become a centre of immigration after experiencing decades of emigration to countries such as America, Australia and Switzerland.\(^5\) Since its unification in 1860, Italy was poor, economically and industrially backward, and had a high birth rate. The promise of better conditions abroad instigated emigration en masse at the end of the nineteenth and during most of the twentieth century. Since the mid 1970s, improved living standards have made Italy “the destination of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, many of them from African countries”.\(^6\)

Italy’s current immigrant population is approximately 4,570,317 out of 60,626,442 million inhabitants, according to 2011 ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) Statistics, or approximately 7.5% of the population.\(^7\) This estimation is likely to be conservative as a significant proportion of entries into Italy is irregular and thus remains unrecorded by authorities. In spite of the growing migration trends, Italy has a “piecemeal approach”\(^8\) to immigration which has resulted in slow integration – and poor infrastructure – for new arrivals.\(^9\) In contrast to the centre-left government’s attempts to promote measures of integration from 1998 until 2001, the Berlusconi leadership emphasized a “purely economic understanding of migration” and restricted the avenues through which migrants could acquire legal status in Italian society.\(^10\) Immigration policy has changed little under recent centre-left and centre-right Italian governments, in spite of changes in leadership. There is still no comprehensive settlement policy for immigrants in Italy.\(^11\) Giovanna Zincone outlines five common attitudes towards immigration in Italian public discourse: solidarist, multiculturalist, functionalist, identitarian and repressive/legalitarian.\(^12\) These attitudes have informed government responses to immigration in Italy, which are outlined below. Zincone identifies a discrepancy between government driven “regularisation” amnesties to allow immigrants to work under Italian law and negative public opinion on immigration.\(^13\)
Yet, in spite of the prevailing antipathy with which many foreigners are regarded, Italy remains attractive for migrants due to its geography which has made the country more approachable than other European nations. Indeed, Italy’s *mediterraneità* – “its proximity to countries of different and contrasting cultures, of very different economic standards from its own”, many of them experiencing great political upheaval – has had significant social implications.\(^{14}\) The porosity of Italy’s borders (its vast coastline) makes the country more approachable than other European nations; hence its reputation as a “launching pad” to other EU destinations. Attempts to impose restrictions on immigration have frequently led to larger clandestine migrant populations. In 1992, for example, excessive restrictions imposed by the Martelli law in the wake of pressure from potential Schengen partners to reduce immigration in Italy resulted in an increased number of unauthorized migrants entering the country.\(^{15}\)

There are many contradictions in Italy’s approach to immigration. While there have been attempts to assist with resettlement, conditions for immigrants in Italy have improved little over the past few decades. An unworkable situation of many responsibilities and few rights persists. Approximately 80 per cent of immigrant workers are not covered by the Italian social security system (INPS), for example.\(^{16}\) Thus, loss of work frequently results in the Italian government’s refusal to renew immigrants’ official documents. As a consequence, most immigrants are forced to accept some of the poorest working conditions – the so-called three-d or five-p jobs\(^ {17}\) – and lowest wages in Italy for fear of returning to their countries of origin.\(^ {18}\) The majority of immigrants are unable to “vote in local elections even after twenty years of holding a regular residence and work permit and paying Italian taxes.”\(^ {19}\)

In spite of a by now well-established migrant presence in Italy, there are still few acquisitions of citizenship. Citizenship is the formal instrument
with which an immigrant acquires equal rights and obligations with the local population. The fact that approximately 7 per cent of the population living in Italy are not Italian citizens confirms just how disorienting and complex acquiring citizenship is in Italy.\textsuperscript{20} Zincone and Basili argue that “the present legislation is in need of reform because it produces an evident detachment of the Italian society from its political community”,\textsuperscript{21} with the consequence that a significant proportion of Italy’s polity now lives without adequate representation.\textsuperscript{22} Migrants in Italy thus bear many of the community’s burdens without receiving its benefits.\textsuperscript{23}

The principle of \textit{jus soli}\textsuperscript{24} whereby anyone born within the jurisdiction of the state is thereby a citizen of that state is not applicable in Italy where citizenship legislation is still based upon a familialistic \textit{jus sanguinis} model.\textsuperscript{25} Citizenship is granted only in special circumstances. These include: when the child of migrant parents reaches adulthood and may request citizenship,\textsuperscript{26} or in the case of a parent or an elder being or having been at some stage an Italian citizen.\textsuperscript{27}

Zincone and Basili outline the requirements thus:

While according to the previous 1912 “Nationality Act” all foreign residents had to wait five years to apply for naturalisation, the current law requires: ten years for foreigners from non-EU countries; five years for exiles and stateless people; just three years for foreigners of Italian origin (two if minors); and four years for foreigners from EU countries. The discount applied to EU nationals is due to the fact that they were considered, at least until the recent enlargement, as members of a sort of extended family.\textsuperscript{28}

Further restrictions have also been imposed. Until recently, marriage with an Italian-born citizen resulted in virtually automatic Italian citizenship.\textsuperscript{29} In July 2009, however, the passing of a “Security Act” in response to concerns over “the lack of legality and security” restricted what was
perceived as a “too-easy route to citizenship”. Act 94 discourages “marriages of convenience”, and has seen the time of marriage for couples resident in Italy rise from six months to two years, with the granting of citizenship requiring evidence of “the persistence of the bond”. Italian citizenship has thus been increasingly denied to bodies that lie outside of a limited definition of “Italian” bloodlines.

2.2 The Case of Somalis in Italy

Italian responses to the influx of Somali migrants and refugees following the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991 have been shaped by such narrow definitions of what it is to be Italian. Akin to other African migrants, Somali refugees in Italy, for instance, are rarely granted Italian citizenship, in spite of the fact that their heritage was shaped significantly, as we have noted, by the Italian presence in Somalia over decades. This area of the continent became known as *l’Africa Orientale Italiana*, indicating how formative the Italian presence in the region was for these countries. In Somalia, for example, institutional education was conducted in Italian or in English or in Arabic until the Somali language became a written one in 1972. Street signs in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, were in Italian. The special relationship of this region with Italy disappeared when Italy lost its influence in the area with the onset of civil war in Somalia, yet the historical legacy remains.

Italian colonial administration of Somalia from the partition of Africa in the 1880s until Somalia’s independence in 1960 has been regarded as brief and benevolent in comparison with, for example, French and British colonialism. Indeed, alongside the notion of a “weak colonialism”, the *Italiani, bravagente* myth has been central to constructions of Italian identity. Colonial studies were until recently limited to the work of historians such as Angelo Del Boca. Fabrizio De Donno and Neelam Srivastava attribute this fact to “the impossibility of access to official colonial records for several decades” post 1945, and to “the general
refusal of the Italian governing class to engage in a sustained and public debate about colonialism, as had occurred in other European ex-colonial nations”.  

Italian postcoloniality is an understudied area, according to De Donno and Srivastava. Alessandro Triulzi is concerned with what he terms the “ambiguous displacements” of colonial memory within both Italian society and Italy’s ex-colonies. Likening “colonial memory and its renewed positioning” to “back-up files which can be accessed according to convenience”, he argues that the “the legend of Italian colonialism as different, more tolerant, and more humane than other colonialisms remains obstinately at large”, in spite of the re-emergence of Italian colonialism “as a topic of heated debate”.  

Consequently, Italy’s colonial legacy has only recently begun to be integrated into “larger narratives of Italian national experience”. There is thus little to distinguish migrants from the ex-colonies from other immigrants. This absence of recognition means that Somali migrants – many of whom speak Italian – can lose their residency permits, resulting in discrimination, irregular work contracts – and thus hazardous occupations – or unemployment. The absence of social support for Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans in Italy suggests that Italy’s legal and moral responsibilities, as a former colonial power, towards migrants and refugees from the region are unmet. In addition, Italy’s aid projects – which were directed chiefly towards Somalia and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa following “a post-imperial pattern” – have been largely ineffectual.  

Unlike other European powers such as Britain or France, where citizenship has been available for most ex-colonial subjects, and who Habermas argues “have had the chance to take up a reflexive distance to themselves”, Italy does not distinguish between migrants from the ex-colonies and elsewhere and thus does not grant citizenship to migrants
from Somalia any more readily than other third country nationals. Thus the cultural identification with Italy experienced by many Somalis, due to their heritage being influenced by the Italian presence in Somalia over decades, has little, if any, impact on the legal status of Somali refugees in Italy. Moreover, Somalis residing in Italy are no longer officially considered stateless in spite of ongoing conflict in Somalia, and the fact that Somalis are among the most represented refugee groups in receipt of publicly funded SPRAR (System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) assistance. As Somali writer Nuruddin Farah notes:

The majority of Somalis do not qualify for refugee status, according to the Italian authorities close reading of the 1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol, because they have no tangible evidence that, as individuals, they are fleeing persecution in their land. Hence their provisional admission into the country as “visitors”…

Farah goes on to note how many in Italy see little need to alter the status of Somalis, now seen as part of a more general exodus from Africa. Alessandro Triulzi considers the dilemma facing what he terms ‘disenfranchised ex-colonial subjects’:

In postcolonial Italy, the African “alterity” is dealt with, culturally and socially, through the ambiguous return of colonial clichés together with representations of modernity and citizenship which, while including sanitized narratives of the country’s colonial past, exclude African migrants from full participation in cultural, social or political life.

Perhaps as a consequence, Italy is viewed by many migrants as a “stopping-off point” and has ceased to be the host country of choice for Somali migrants and refugees. Due to the suspension of the 1992 Italian decree in recognition of Somalis’ humanitarian status as refugees, the presence of Somalis drastically declined from 20,000 in the early 1990s to an estimated presence of between 5 and 6 thousand in 2006.
According to a decree by the President of Cabinet, out of the 2008 annual quota of 150,000 for TCN workers in Italy, a mere 100 places were reserved for Somalis.\textsuperscript{48} Other EU countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands or countries outside Europe such as Canada, Australia and the USA are now preferred for resettlement. Figure 2.1 provides a story of these changes in migration trends.

**Figure 2.1: Comparison of Somalia born population in Italy and Australia**

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<td>Australia</td>
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Sources: Italy: Caritas, ISTAT; Australia: ABS, DIMA.

It should be noted that these figures do not capture the numbers of people with Somali ancestry residing in the two countries. Were the 2011 figures to include numbers of people with Somali-born parents, for example, they would likely be approximately three times the size of those above.

Matteo Guglielmo and Petra Mezzetti report that the Somali community in Italy “suffers from a certain degree of cleavage”, between a “historical group” of Somalis who have been living in Italy since before the civil war and those who arrived later (and continue to arrive).\textsuperscript{49}

### 3.1 The Australian Context

Before the European invasion in 1788, which marked the beginning of Australia as a nation of migrants, the land mass now known as Australia was inhabited by nations of indigenous peoples. Following European arrival however, the largest migrant group in Australia was British,\textsuperscript{50} and for much of the next two centuries, this is how it remained, with “all immigration from outside the United Kingdom and other English-
The 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, quotas in the 1920s and “virtual prohibitions” in the 1930s on non-British immigration, the limitation of “citizenship rights to British subjects” and the “White Australia” Policy ensured that in 1947, as immigration analyst James Jupp has outlined:

Australia could claim to be 99% white and 96% British… Anglicans were the largest single domination, suggesting that Australians of English origin were the largest element of the population. Fifty years later, however, Catholics were the largest religious domination and people of non-European descent constituted six per cent of Australians. Almost a quarter of all Australians were born overseas and languages other than English increasingly spoken included Chinese, Arabic, Vietnamese, Macedonian, Croatian and Filipino. In the most recent census statistics of 2011, the major birthplaces of Australians included China, Hong Kong, Fiji, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Lebanon, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka.

The significant cultural shift that took place over those fifty years can be attributed to changes in Australia’s immigration policy, beginning in 1945 with the introduction of the Department of Immigration under the Chifley Labor Government. Following the end of World War Two, defence, economic, foreign policy and population concerns propelled Australia to sign the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) agreement, allowing the resettlement of displaced Central and Eastern Europeans. To meet the demands of the country’s burgeoning industrialisation, Australia at this time was unable rely on what had hitherto been a predominantly British migrant intake and agreed to accept “an annual quota of displaced persons”. While Minister Arthur Calwell’s administration of the Immigration Department sought initially to maintain White Australia (which included the deportation of “allied refugees of Asian origin, thousands of whom had fled to Australia from
the Japanese”, while simultaneously attempting to attract Europeans who conformed to the racialist guidelines established under White Australia), immigration policy slowly began to accommodate migrants from “non-traditional” sources.

Australia became involved in further humanitarian migration programmes by signing the Geneva Convention and Protocol in 1973, which would have significant consequences for the “White Australia” policy, officially ended under the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, with Al Grassby, Minister for Immigration, heralding the beginning of a new era of “multiculturalism”. Unlike the immigration and settlement policies that preceded it, multiculturalism proclaimed the value of many different cultures, rather than assuming that “other cultures were inferior to and incompatible with the ‘mainstream’ culture of White British Australia.”

For all its flaws, multiculturalism has significantly shaped Australian public life and has granted migrants access to significant benefits. Mark Lopez’ political history of multiculturalism, *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945-1975* (1999), elucidates its ideology. Lopez locates four key strands – cultural pluralism, welfare multiculturalism, ethnic structural pluralism and ethnic rights multiculturalism – that have informed Australian multiculturalism as an ideal and as a policy.

In February 2011, the latest version of Australian multiculturalism was released by the government in a statement that articulated multiculturalism as: “embracing and benefiting from the strength of our different cultural traditions” by “respond[ing] to our cultural diversity” with the aim of “strengthen[ing] social cohesion”. In addition, there is commitment “to an access and equity framework to ensure that the onus is on government to provide equitable services to Australians from all backgrounds.” A shift away from active political struggle for migrants’
rights is evident in the contemporary emphasis on unity within “cultural diversity”, which is celebrated annually on “Harmony Day”, a key government initiative to promote cohesion.65

Australia’s contemporary treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in many senses mirrors the developments outlined above insofar as both right and left wing governments have detained asylum seekers via regimes of incarceration and control. Due to its relative geographic isolation, Australia’s capacity to exercise control over unauthorised arrivals has been much higher than many other nations. Such control represents a significant departure from the late 1970s, when Australia saw the arrival by boat of Vietnamese refugees, which coincided with the end of the White Australia Policy. In 1976, the Fraser Liberal Government began to welcome Vietnamese refugees fleeing communism who had arrived by boat. In spite of negative media representations of “boat people”, the Fraser Government continued to welcome them, establishing a resettlement plan for Indo-Chinese asylum seekers.

Until the Fraser Government lost office to Hawke in the 1983 election, Australia’s intake of migrants from Vietnam, Cambodia and China amounted to more than 15000 annually.66 The election of the Hawke Labor Government brought with it significant modifications to refugee policy. The Hawke Government’s objective was to control refugee and asylum seeker flows. This was achieved by way of introducing mandatory detention for unauthorised arrivals by boat and a new generation of detention centres that were instituted, in particular the Port Hedland detention centre, opened in 1992, in a remote part of Western Australia. It can be argued that the public perception of “boat people” altered at this time inasmuch as seeing asylum seekers incarcerated encouraged people to regard them as criminals.67

Temporary Protection Visas (TPV) were introduced for onshore refugee arrivals by the Howard Coalition Government in 1999. Unlike refugees
who entered the country as part of the offshore migration program on Permanent Protection Visas (PPV), and were eligible to apply for citizenship after two years of living in Australia, refugees on TPVs who were unable to renew their visas were returned to their “home countries” on their expiry. Criticised by Human Rights groups, TPVs were abolished in 2008 by the Rudd Labor Government and replaced by Resolution of Status Visas (RoS), which enable access to the same benefits and entitlements as the PPV. Since election of the Abbott government in 2013, TPVs have been reintroduced, alongside a new class of ‘Safe Haven Enterprise’ visas (SHEV) in December 2014, which allow asylum seekers to stay in Australia for up to five years, provided study or a work contract in a regional area of the country is in place.

While the onshore program was created in accordance with Australia’s obligation under the Refugees Convention, the offshore program was “designed and implemented over time by the Australian Government on its own initiative”. In this way, the government can monitor the categories and numbers of asylum seekers it chooses to accept, evading its legal responsibility to protect onshore asylum seekers.

While there are instances of humanitarianism, such as the welcoming of Indochinese refugees under Fraser and the granting of permanent residency to Chinese students under Hawke in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Australian immigration programmes have generally been selective and only welcoming of people that are in some direct way able to benefit the country.

Likewise, skilled migration has been privileged by Australian governments for the purposes of building the nation’s economy while arrivals of refugees have been viewed as a threat resulting in rejection via incarceration and, in some cases, deportation. Australia’s border protection practices have been emulated in other countries, including Italy. For example, the excising of a number of Australian islands in the
pacific from Australia’s migration zone under the Howard government – what was referred to as the “Pacific solution” – was considered best practice by the Centre-Right Italian government policy makers. This led to the construction of a number of CPT detention-like centres in the far south on the island of Lampedusa, a first point of contact with Italy for many Somali migrants.

3.2 Somalis in Australia

During the past decade, Somalia has often featured as one of the top ten countries of birth for humanitarian entrants to Australia, according to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. In spite of a history of Somali emigration “based on serving in British merchant ships”, Somalis were unable to settle in Australia until the end of the White Australia policy, which meant they were unable to settle in Australia for the next 70 years. While the first Somalis began arriving in Australia in the 1980s, it was not until the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991 that a humanitarian migration programme was established. From refugee camps in African countries that are Somalia’s neighbours, many – particularly women under the “Women at Risk” humanitarian visa category – have arrived in Australia. Other Somalis have migrated via family connections when there has been the possibility of sponsorship via Family Reunion visas. While they may be regarded as an “emerging” community in Australia, Somalis as a cultural group are nevertheless a minority in Australian society.

In 1993, as part of the United Nations intervention in Somalia, Australia assigned 1000 peace-keeping troops to the country until the failure of the intervention in 1995. A year later, Somali born people in Australia amounted to 2061: most resided in Melbourne and almost all were Sunni Muslims. Somalis largely arrived in Australia as humanitarian entrants, or via reunion with family members. From 1994 until 1998, over 2000 Somalis settled permanently in Australia, many in Springvale and other
Melbourne suburbs. Access to public housing in the inner suburbs of the North such as Moonee Valley and Moreland made these areas attractive for Somalis. Few Somalis in this group found employment due to incompatible language skills and levels of education.

A number of Somali organisations such as the Somali Relief Association, the West Somali Relief Association and Somali Community in Victoria were subsequently established to address issues of unemployment and welfare. Social centres such as the Migrant Resource Centre North East, the Ecumenical Migration Centre and the Refugee Advice and Casework Service of Victoria have conducted extensive resettlement work among Somalis.

Somalis in Australia, like other migrants, can become Australian citizens after four years of residence in the country. The most recent version of Australia’s policy of multiculturalism, “The People of Australia” (2011), outlines the rights and responsibilities of all Australian residents. Somalis may access English lessons, schools and government health and welfare services such as Centrelink and Medicare; are protected by a national Anti-Racism and Discrimination Initiative, and are free to practice their cultural beliefs, provided these do not contravene Australian law. This can become problematic for some Somalis as common practices in Somali culture, such as Female Genital Circumcision, are controversial and prohibited in Australia. A number of community organisations such as Women’s Health West exist to assist Somali women with similar cultural concerns. Further cultural issues associated with Somali settlement are discussed below.

The Ecumenical Migration Centre produces an independent Migration Action journal, to explore issues surrounding refugees, immigration and multiculturalism. Dedicated to Somali resettlement in Melbourne, the first edition of the journal for 2005 featured articles on youth education and includes suggestions by Somali poet, academic and refugee Yusuf
Sheikh Omar for future directions in resettlement of the community. In his article titled: “Young Somalis in Australia: an educational approach to challenges and recommended solutions”, Omar canvasses the various challenges and difficulties encountered by Somali students in Melbourne. The author highlights language as the greatest challenge to academic progress. Somali students tend to struggle in developing writing skills while they excel verbally due to their cultural background in which oral adroitness is revered. Lack of English language ability combined with culture shock often leads to feelings of isolation at school. Omar describes such shock:

Generally speaking, Somali communities in western countries have maintained their specific cultural and religious characteristics. As a result, these communities, especially young people, often find themselves caught between two cultures creating tension and confusion.\(^8^5\)

It is difficult for many young Somalis, furthermore, to integrate into “the Australian life style” without appearing disloyal and alienating the family and Somali community. At the same time, young Somalis conforming to the traditional cultural values of their parents risk isolation at school inasmuch as they may be restricted from participating in the activities on offer. Omar observed that at the time of writing, few young Somalis, moreover, intended to resettle permanently in Australia: “Many of them hope to go back to Somalia, Africa or the Muslim world”.\(^8^6\)

Omar identifies a third way for Somali students to resettle in the host society, arguing that it is possible for refugee students to be “proud of their culture and social identity” while maintaining openness towards “the new culture.” Such a balance, he maintains, would enable students to adapt to the new environment while simultaneously contributing “to their own culture in their new country”.\(^8^7\) Omar considers some of the ways in which the school system could be improved to aid the resettlement process. These include teaching English as a second language in smaller
groups and teaching the mother tongue as “the basic skill of reading transfers readily and dynamically” from the first to the second language. In addition, Omar recommends that Australian schools cultivate understanding of Somali culture by adopting an interfaith model, which would “mark the major celebrations of all cultural groups, including the Somali community, and invite community members to participate in the preparation”. Identifying the need for cultural maintenance and development among Somalis in Australia, Omar outlines how special support, including the welcoming of parent participation in special programmes organised by schools, should be available to Somali students whose schooling has been interrupted by civil war and displacement.

Based in Heidelberg, the Australian Somali Youth Association (ASYA), of which Omar was president at the time of its inception in 2003, addresses some of the resettlement concerns highlighted above. ASYA seeks to bridge the cultural gap between Somali youth and the mainstream by motivating and inspiring Somalis to build an academic future in Australia. Reduced dropout rates and increased numbers of secondary school and university graduates are some of the association’s aims.

Women’s Health West in Footscray is another example of an organisation facilitating Somali resettlement insofar as it has established a Somali Women’s group that holds weekly meetings. During these times, “Family and Reproductive Rights Education Program” (FARREP) service providers present health and wellbeing related information to Somali women with the assistance of a Somali interpreter. The organisation also provides assistance and information on the delicate and controversial issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), which is increasingly problematic in the Western countries in which Somalis
resettle. The kind of assistance offered in Australia is rare in Italy, where infibulated women tend to be viewed as laboratory guinea pigs.

4 Conclusion: Comparing Settlement Contexts and Trajectories

In summary, Australia offers official recognition to Somali refugees in the form of citizenship within a multicultural model, however limited or “thin” this may be. Italy, in contrast, seldom grants citizenship to Somalis and thus offers this group of migrants little stability. In the absence of comprehensive settlement policies, most Somalis have preferred to resettle elsewhere due to poor living conditions. Yet while the civic infrastructure for migrants in Italy is poor, a number of second generation Somalis have had palpable artistic success there in cultural endeavours that are only just beginning to emerge in Australia. The cultural comparison of Somali resettlement in Italy and Australia becomes more complex when cultural opportunities are considered. Different models of “cultural citizenship” may be at work, suggesting the potential for both societies to learn from the resettlement experiences of the other.

Notes and References

1 Over the last three decades since the collapse of the state and eruption of civil war, a large number of people fled Somalia and dispersed across the globe. The number of people that have fled the country is estimated at one million or above. A majority of this diaspora population resides in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, the Gulf States, Europe, North America and Australia. There are also significant communities in Malaysia and South Africa.


3 For an insight into “thick” and “thin” conceptions of citizenship, see Bauböck (1999).

4 Blunt and Dowling, Home, 6.

6 Some scholars estimate that “over the last two decades of the twentieth century, up to a million or more African immigrants entered Italy, whose southern islands are only a few miles from the northern coast of Africa.” Sante Matteo (ed.) *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures* (Stony Brook, NY: Forum Italicum, 2001), 3.

7 Statistics on immigration trends in Italy can be located at: http://dati.istat.it/


9 Considering the recent nature of the immigration experiences in Italy and Spain, Colin Crouch argues that these countries “lack institutions for coping with ethnic and cultural pluralism”. Colin Crouch, *Social Change in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 406.


Demanding, dangerous and dirty or pesanti, precari, pericolosi, poco pagati, penalizzati socialmente. Ambrosini and Berti cited in Kosic and Triandafyllidou, *European Immigration*, 190.


Zincone and Basili write that: “In July 2009, there were nearly four million foreign people legally resident in Italy, representing 6.5 per cent of the total population. 8.9 per cent of the employees and 4.5 per cent of the self-employed are immigrants in Italy. According to the 2009 Report of the Bank of Italy, immigrants contribute 4 per cent of fiscal and contributory receipts and consume only 2 per cent of the welfare spending.” Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 19.

Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 19.

Rainer Bauböck argues that the subjection of “resident foreign citizens” to territorial sovereignty without representation in the making of laws is a deviation from the basic norms of democratic legitimation of political authority.’ Rainer Bauböck, “Recombinant Citizenship,” In: Alison Woodward and Martin Kohli (eds.) *Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies* (London: Routledge, 2001), 46.

Bauböck defines the polity as “an intergenerational community whose members share in benefits and burdens which derive from living under a common political authority.” Rainer Bauböck, *National Community, Citizenship and Cultural Diversity*. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Political Science Series No. 5. (2009).

Ayelet Shachar describes the *jus soli* principle as having its origins in “the common law tradition” wherein there is an implicit “territorial understanding of birthright citizenship”, and a recognition of “the right of each person born within a physical jurisdiction of a given state to acquire full and equal membership in
that polity.” “Redefining citizenship as property” In Behabib et al. (eds.) Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260.

According to Zincone and Basili, Italy’s *jus sanguinis*, familistic model derives from “its late achievement of national unity” and the country’s legacy of emigration which led to the introduction of “legislation that made the public community of citizens coincide with the ethnic community of nationals”, with the aim of fortifying connections “between Italian expatriates and their descendants.” Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. 1. *Country Report: Italy*. www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ [Accessed 20 Nov 2009].

Legislation 91 passed in 1992 specifies that children born in Italy to foreign parents are not eligible to become Italian citizens until they turn 18, at which time they must prove that they have resided in Italy without interruption, and have a year in which to claim citizenship. Corrado Giustiniani, *Fratellastri d’Italia: Vite di stranieri tra noi*. (Bari: Laterza, 2003), 152.


Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 1.

As long as the couple are living in Italy. Should the couple be outside of Italy, citizenship would be granted after 3 years of marriage. Caritas Statistical Dossier 2002, 162.

Zincone and Basili, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2.


The Somali Language became the medium of instruction of primary and secondary education in Somalia in mid 1970s. English and Arabic languages were still the medium of instruction in some subjects or schools but there was no role at all for Italian in this level. However, in tertiary education, Italian was the primary language of instruction from its inception in 1954 until the collapse of Somali central government in 1991. Over the past two decades, the languages of instruction in primary and secondary schools were Arabic,
English and Somali; while English and Arabic became the teaching languages in tertiary education in Somalia.

Towards the mid-nineteenth century the Somali Peninsula became a sphere of competition between the three European colonies: Great Britain, Italy, and France; they divided it into five territories. Two territories gained their independence in 1960; a British protectorate from Great Britain, and Italian Somaliland from Italy; these joined together to form the Somali Republic. After independence Italy was the most influential country in Somalia.

For an investigation of some of the brutalities that occurred during Italy’s administration of *L’Africa Orientale Italiana*, see Angelo Del Boca’s history of Italian colonialism, Angelo Del Boca, *Italiani, brava gente?* (Milano: Neri Pozza, 2005).

For an introduction to Italian colonial cultures, see Patrizia Palumbo, (ed.) *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present* (California: University of California Press, 2003).


In Somalia, for instance, Italy’s funds did not address civil rights concerns, failed to control the deployment of military aid, and tended to end up in the hands of élites rather than contributing to the needs of the poor: ‘[F]rom 1988 onwards, the first scandals about Italian aid began to break, first with a fertilizer factory which had cost 100 billion lire to build but never began production, and then with the construction of 3,000 useless silos in fibreglass throughout the villages of Somalia…When an independent monitoring of 121 aid projects took place in 1993, 40 per cent of them were found to have failed
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completely, and of the remaining 60 per cent half functioned poorly.’ Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 238-39.

41 See EUDO citizenship observatory. www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/


43 Somalis were the fifth most represented refugee group that received assistance from SPRAR in 2006. (2007 Caritas Statistical Dossier) 504. In 2010, they were the group that received most assistance. (SPRAR Central Service data bank).


45 Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora*, 63.

46 Alessandro Triulzi, “Displacing the Colonial Event”, 430.

47 The 2007 Caritas Statistical Dossier records the Somali presence in Italy as 5,150, 0.1 per cent of the migrant population, in 2006. Caritas Dossier 2007, 485.


57 Australia was to “populate or perish”, as the country was considered “too thinly populated and too reliant on primary industry to resist attack or invasion from Asia.” Jupp, *Immigration*, 102.

58 The DP program was concluded by 1953. Jupp, *the Australian People*, 831.


61 Designed in Canada in 1968, multiculturalism aimed “to cater for the large number of Canadians whose origins were neither British nor French.” In contrast with Australia, multiculturalism in Canada has “never been officially managed by agencies concerned with immigration.” Jupp, *Arrivals and Departures*, 7.


67 MacCallum contends that “Previously the boat people had been treated as guests, albeit uninvited ones who did not yet enjoy all the privileges of residents. Now they were isolated and locked up. Clearly they must be
guilty of something to be treated so like criminals.” MacCallum, “Girt By Sea: Australia, Refugees and the Politics of Fear”, 23.


69 Entitlements include welfare allowances and English classes. www.immi.gov.au.


71 O’Kane, Refugee and Asylum Seeker Issues in Australia, 28

72 The imminent introduction of the “Significant Investor Visa” in 2012, which enables billionaires to become Australian citizens provided they invest and reside in the country for an equivalent period of forty days every year for four years, is a further example of this attitude. www.immi.gov.au.

73 Including the deportation of Australian citizens who were mistaken for “illegal” immigrants.


76 Jupp, The Australian People, 688.

77 Jupp, The Australian People, 688.


79 According to Jupp: “By 1989 there were already 388 000 Somali refugees in neighbouring countries, most of them in Ethiopia. Australia processed refugees mainly through its immigration post in Nairobi, Kenya, having no diplomatic presence in Somalia or Ethiopia.” Jupp, The Australian People, 688.
This is a consequence of the fact that “Many Somalis passed through the Enterprise hostel at Springvale, which was closed in 1993.” Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.


Somali community groups that have been formed include the Somali Community of New South Wales in Sydney, “which received a substantial grant from the Department of Immigration in 1993” and a number of small organizations… in Brisbane, Canberra and Adelaide.” Jupp, *The Australian People*, 688.


Omar, “The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…”, 15

When “immigrant students feel pride in their ethnic culture and heritage, their self-esteem and sense of identity is enhanced.” Links with their communities are reinforced and an increase in confidence makes possible a positive contribution to “the new culture”. Omar, “The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…”, 16.
91 Omar advises schools “to recruit, train and employ some refugee/immigrant professionals who have the same language and cultural background of the refugee/immigrant students” for the purposes of teaching “community languages, cultures and religions” and providing “cultural interpretations to parents, children and school staff.” Such figures also present positive role models for the students. Omar, “The Educational and Employment Aspirations of Somali High-School Students…”, 17.

92 Somalis living in Heidelberg have a penchant for calling the area “Somaliberg” due to the large numbers of Somalis inhabiting the suburb.

93 The organisation has created a brochure titled “Healthy African Women” in Somali, Arabic, Amharic and Tigrigna which lists local community health centres, hospitals, key women’s health screenings and information about childbirth and female genital mutilation. See (Women’s Health West, 2005).

94 Matthews, “Female Genital Mutilation: Australian Law, Policy and Practical Challenges for Doctors,” 140.

95 Amina, an infibulated Somali woman interviewed by Italian Somali writer Igiaba Scego, recalls her first gynaecological examination in Italy: “I have never felt so humiliated and sad. They were queuing to see my mutilation! Fortunately I met a talented Italian doctor who had spent some time in Uganda and Djibouti, so he knew all about FGM practices. He helped me enormously, giving me a hand with getting my life together as a woman and mother. There is a need [in Italy] for better health education and awareness and for appropriate psychological support.” My translation from an interview conducted by Igiaba Scego, “La donna violata,” In MigranteMente: Il popolo invisibile prende la parola, ed. Sabatino Annecchiarico (Bologna: Editrice Missionaria Italiana, 2005), 100.